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NOTE: Amounts have generally been expressed in ECU, the value and composition of which 
have changed many times over the years. The gradual changeover from the old budgetary unit of 
account to the ECU is described on pages 32 to 34. The term used in any particular section of the 
text will depend on the rules in force at the time referred to. A. Perspectives and Problems 
Budgetary and financial problems have long dogged the development of the Euro-
pean Community and have sometimes even threatened its very existence. At the end 
of 1984, the Community had to make spending cuts in order to cover that year's 
expenditure from available own resources. In December 1984, the European Parlia-
ment rejected the 1985 draft budget because it realized that the estimated revenue 
would only cover necessary expenditure until the autumn. 
When the Community has hit the headlines in recent years, it has usually been in 
connection with 'Community budget deficits', 'budgetary reform', 'budgetary discip-
line' or 'budget disputes'. There is obvious scope for disputes between the Commun-
ity and the Member States, between the Member States themselves and between the 
institutions involved in the budgetary procedure-Parliament, the Council and the 
Commission. 
5 Large but still relatively modest budget 
The amounts involved are huge in themselves. With the supplementary and amend-
ing budget approved by the Council and Parliament in October, the 1984 budget 
totalled  27 248 627 722 ECU, i.e.  almost DM 61  000 million.  This represents 
only 0.987% of the 10 Member States' gross domestic product for that year. It is 
equivalent to only 2. 7% of the 10 national budgets. However, in terms of volume, 
the 1984 Community budget is as large as the Danish budget (DKR 228 000 million 
i.e. 27 900 million ECU) or the Greek (16 000 million ECU) and Irish (11  000 mill-
ion ECU) together. The 1984 Community budget is also bigger than the budget of 
the largest Land in the Federal  Republic of Germany, North Rhine Westphalia, 
which had a budget of DM 57 200 million (25 600 ECU) in 1984 compared with 
15 900 million ECU in Bavaria, 14 500 million ECU in Baden-Wiirttemberg and 
11  300 million ECU in Lower Saxony. 
If  the loans raised on the capital markets (see pages 25 and onwards) are added to 
the total budget, the Community's funds for  1984 were 35 000 million ECU, or 
about one-third of the amount the nine Member States belonging to NATO (i.e. 
excluding Ireland) spent on defence according to NATO statistics for 1984. 
A new public-sector budget 
Many people still regard the Community's financial problems and requirements as a 
new obscure sector of public finance. They glibly point to what they think is a very 
e"pensive bureaucracy. However, only 4.54% of the budget is spent on personnel 
and administration in all the Community institutions. The Commission accounts for 
2.98%, the Council  for  0.41%  and Parliament for 0.81%.  Repayments  to the 
Member States for the costs they incur in collecting own resources are almost as high 
as the institutions' total administrative costs. At 1 000 million ECU, they accounted 
for 4.06% of the 1984 budget. A further 4.43% went on compensatory payments 
(mainly to the United Kingdom). This still left 23 700 million ECU, i.e.  86.8% 
of the budget, to be spent on operations, hence to be redistributed amongst the 
Member States. 
Expenditure on agricultural market organizations accounts for the lion's share with 
an average of two-thirds (67.28% in 1984), since only agricultural policy and its 
financing arrangements have so far become fully 'European'. In  1984, 13.6% of 
funds went on structural policies (Agricultural, Regional and Social Funds), 3.29% 
on development cooperation (excluding the European Development Fund which is 
financed  from  sources  outside the  budget)  and 2.64%  on research,  energy  and 
industry. 
6 The fact that there is now a new level of public finance tends to mislead the general 
public into thinking that this  entails  an  additional  burden on the  Community's 
Member States  and their citizens.  This highly  complex  subject which  only real 
experts are fully able to fathom, gives free  rein to misunderstanding and misinter-
pretation. Fair and constructive criticism of public financial management, essential 
in a democracy, slides all too easily into sweeping condemnation and prejudice. 
There is a constant temptation when all the Member States are in a difficult financial 
situation to use the Community and its finances as a scapegoat for rising expendi-
ture. This overlooks the fact that the Community budget is simply a reflection of 
decisions taken jointly and mechanisms set up by common agreement. The reality is 
7 that decisions often cannot be taUen since no consensus can· be found on  m~eting  the 
costs. 
Unique among international organizations 
International organizations are usually financed by contributions from their Mem-
ber States. In most cases their financial requirements are for staff and administrative 
costs only.  Should any organization be assigned an operational function, the cost 
will normally be borne only by those Member States which took the corresponding 
decision (the 'la carte' system). There is virtually no transfer of funds, let alone fiscal 
adjustment. This is the system applied in all the 200-odd international organizations 
to which most Community countries and often the Community itself belong. It  is the 
practice of the UN and its specialized agencies, OECD, EFTA, the East bloc orga-
nization Comecon (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance - CMEA), NATO 
and the Warsaw Pact. 
Financing the European Community is  quite a different matter. In the light of its 
. objectives,  Member States transfer to it certain of their functions  and activities, 
which are then pursued and financed in common. The funds needed are made over 
to the Community, reshuffled, and returned to the Member States. These are the 
appropriations for Community operations, which are allocated in accordance with 
common decisions. 
So far, however, this method has been used only for agriculture and, to a limited 
extent, for regional and social measures and for development cooperation (Lome 
Conventions and food aid). The Community is still far removed from a scenario in 
which Member States transfer real responsibility to it for financial  management, 
e.g.  for economic or monetary policy, together with control over related revenue 
and expenditure.  · 
In international intergovernmental organizations staff and administrative expendi-
ture accounts for between 95  and 100% of contributed funds.  In the Community 
budget for 1984, around 1 200 million ECU- or 4.5% was entered to cover staff 
and administrative expenditure of all the Community bodies. That gives some idea 
of the difference, as does the fact that the governments of the Community Member 
States pay the equivalent of around 14 000 million ECU in contributions to these 
200-odd international organizations, with nothing  in  money  terms to show in 
return.  By  contrast, they pay 27 300 million ECU into the Community budget, 
almost nine-tenths of which  will  be returned to them - albeit redistributed -
reducing their national budgets by the same amount. 
8 Towards federal financing 
The Community is still far short of constituting a federation. At the supranational 
level at which the Member States have pitched the Community, however, common 
financing must nevertheless observe some of the ground rules and limitations inhe-
rent to a federation if it is to be successful and effective in promoting integration. 
As is the case in a federation, Community financing means a transfer of resources 
from a national to a common supranational level, the aim to finance operations and 
activities geared to the integration of  peoples and countries in the Community. This 
can only be accomplished, or accomplished more effectively than would be the case 
if left to the individual countries, if resources are pooled. This was the purpose of 
the decisions taken between 1962 and 1970 to set up the common agricultural poli-
cy and fund it jointly. All attempts to establish even remotely similar common polici-
es in other fields,  such as energy, transpon, development aid or regional policy, 
involving a transfer of jurisdiction to the Community institutions and a grouping of 
the  required  funds,  have  so  far  failed:  What the  Community budget  is  able  to 
achieve through the Regional and Social Funds and structural and industrial assis-
tance measures is little more than a series of stop-gaps, rather than the product of a 
common policy as normally understood in the context of economic integration. As 
long as this does not change, it will regrettably be 'normal' for around two-thirds of 
the budget to be spent on the common agricultural policy. This proponion can be 
reduced significantly only if other genuine common policies are adopted and finan-
ced through the Community budget. 
The funds managed by the Community should not, theoretically, increase Member 
States' normal expenditure and impose an extra burden on taxpayers. If, on the 
other hand, everyone insists on getting back exactly what he  has paid in (the 'fair 
return' concept), the whole exercise becomes pointless. The prime objective of  trans-
ferring responsibilities to the Community level-in other words entrusting activities 
and expenditure to collective decision-making and collective financing - is to bene-
fit from the impact and cost-effectiveness of united action. At the same time, collec-
tive financing implies that the Jess prosperous and less advanced countries receive 
the resources which enable them to catch up and panicipate in the Community on 
an equal footing.  This means that the better-off panners will have to pay more. 
While obtaining a smaller return from the Community in the shon term, however, 
these countries should bear in mind that their apparent sacrifice is really an invest-
ment in the future, since their initially weaker panners - assuming the flow of 
funds is maintained - will eventually attain a market potential equal to theirs. 
9 Net beneficiaries and net contributors 
The distinction made between net beneficiaries and net contributors by  comparing 
the  Member States' financial  contributions with the payments made to them in 
return is also part of  the game. This concept may be of some interest to mathemati-
cians, but, except where an 'unacceptable situation' has arisen in one Member State, 
it  is  an  inappropriate  and  oversimplistic  measure  of the progress of European 
integration. This is particularly true since the Community, with its aim of establish-
ing comparable conditions throughout the Community market, helps provide assis-
tance and investment, which a single Member State with its limited resources would 
be unable to afford. 
But it is a different story in practice where the financing of the common agricultural 
policy is concerned. Here the system devised to redistribute resources and promote 
integration has drifted off course. Quite frequently, the healthier sectors of Europ-
ean agriculture-be they individual farms, regions or even whole Member States-
have obtained Community funds which ought really to have gone to areas where 
there is a need for improving agricultural strm:tures and means of  production. Given 
the cumbersome decision-making procedures and the conflicting interests involved, 
this can only be corrected by reforming the agricultural policy and, given the squeeze 
on all  budgets, including the Community's, by bringing it into line with general 
economic policy. 
Parallels in history 
Disputes constantly rage in the Community between the Member States, or between 
the institutions (Parliament, Council and Commission) involved  in the decision-
making process, or sometimes between the two, about respective roles in distribut-
ing and redistributing funds and about shares of the Community cake. This is by no 
means as unusual as it is often made out to be, and the situation certainly does not 
deserve the fuss made of it in the press. Not only are disputes of this kind the order 
of the day in federal or newly-federated systems; they are also a perfectly normal 
occurrence  in  fully-constituted  federations.  This  is  something  which  all  States 
founding a federation or confederation have experienced from the start, and had to 
learn to live with. The United States, Switzerland, the Federal Republic of  Germany, 
Canada and Australia are all good  examples. 
A group of independent experts set up by the Commission to study the role of public 
finance in European integration, under the chairmanship of Sir Donald MacDougall 
made a detailed analysis of the five  federations listed above, together with three 
10 Budget of the  European  Community 
1985  (million ECU) 
Commitments  1 
D  Intervention appropriations  29 283.6 
Administrative appropriations of the European 
Commission (staff, information 
etc.)  884.5 
Other Community institutions  447.9 
Development cooperation  1 322.8 
Agriculture 
- EAGGF (Guarantee Section) 
- EAGGF (Guidance Section) 
-Other 
20 667.7 
19 955.0 
656.0 
56.7 
• From the 1985 budget ol the European Communities, voted by the European Part1ament on  t3 June.  1985 
1 046.9 
Regional policy 
Regional Fund 
-Other 
91.6 
2 497.1 
2 289.9 
207.2 
Social  policy 
- Social Fund 
2 010.0 
221.3 
11 contrasting examples of centrally-managed Community States (France, Italy and the 
United Kingdom). The MacDougall report is an impressive contribution to under-
standing this subject. It was published in two volumes by the Commission in April 
1977. 
In the United States, it took the central government and Congress - formed by the 
Confederation of 1781 -more than 80 years (until after the Civil War) to institute 
own resources other than revenue from customs duties. Even today, 'revenue shar-
ing'  between  the  Federal  Government  in  Washington  and  the  individual  states 
remains a source of constant frictions in American domestic policy. 
In Switzerland, the federal element, is very much in evidence, since the cantons jea-
lously defend their sovereignty in tax matters. Fiscal adjustment between the diffe-
rent levels of government is frequently, and hotly, debated in Switzerland. 
The specific  problems of federation  and the practical experience of the  Federal 
Republic of Germany are in many ways illuminating for the development of finan-
cial relations between the Community and its Member States: 
The Federal German State, which emerged as a customs federation in 1867 from the 
German customs union formed  in  1834, and became  a political entity with the 
founding of the German Empire in  1871, did not become a fully-fledged customs 
union until1888. Until1913, and in some respects even until Erzberger's finance 
reform in  1919-20, it remained dependent on matricular contributions from  its 
member states ('the hanger-on of  the constituent states', as Bismarck called it). This 
led to the development of a 'fiscal federation'. The federation did not receive full cus-
toms power until the Basic Law was adopted in Bonn in 1949. 
12 B. The Community's own resources 
The European Community has been  quicker than the central authorities in the 
abovementioned cases of earlier federations in obtaining from its Member States, 
in  addition to revenue from customs and similar duties, a slice of the tax cake, 
albeit a tiny one as yet. 
The Community's own resources are now constituted as follows: 
1980  19841  19851 
Amount  I 
%  Amount  I 
%  Amount  I 
% 
Size of budget (in million ECU)  16 037  25 449  25 691 
of  which:(%) 
customs duties  37.0  31.0  31.5 
agricultural levies  9.3  7.6  5.4 
sugar levies  3.1  4.8  3.9 
value-added tax  44.7  56.5  58.2 
-- -- --
Total own resources  94.1  99.9  99.0 
Other revenue  5.9  0.1  1.0 
-- -- --
100.0  100.0  100.0 
1 tncluding supplementary and amending budget. 
1 Situation after the Council meeting (Budgets) on 24 Aprill98S. 
The assignment of customs revenue to the Community was a logical corollary to the 
Treaty's objective of creating a customs union between the Member States after a 
transitional period. A customs union is characterized by a common external customs 
tariff coupled with the abolition of internal customs duties.  This distinguishes it 
from a free-trade area, in which there is freedom from internal customs duties but no 
single external tariff. In a customs union the country into which goods are imported 
from a non-member country is not necessarily the country of destination. The cus-
toms union promotes geographical shifts in import flows,  with preference being 
given to the nearest point of entry (port or airport) and to the shortest or quickest 
13 overland route. Customs revenue is therefore frequently collected in a country other 
than the country of destination or consumption. The only way to neutralize the 
effects of these shifts is to have this revenue made over to the union - in this case 
the Community. 
The EEC Treaty signed in  1957 therefore provided (in Article 201) for financial 
contributions from the Member States (proportional contributions paid in accor-
dance with an agreed scale based on shares of gross national product, or other crite-
ria) to be replaced by revenue from  customs duties once the Common Customs 
Tariff was introduced. This Common Customs Tariff (CCT) was introduced on 1 
July 1968. After the United Kingdom, Denmark and Ire1and joined the Community 
in  1973 and Greece in 1981, they introduced the CCT in stages over a five-year 
period. When the decision setting up the common agricultural policy was taken in 
1962, it was agreed that proceeds from agricultural levies (similar to customs duties) 
should also be made over to the Community budget and used for joint expenditure. 
Agricultural levies are charged on agricultural products imported from non-member 
countries, which  are subject to common market organizations. They are chiefly 
designed to offset the difference between the - usually higher - Community price 
and the price at which the products are available on the world market. 
Community own resources In 1985  % 
(26 452 million ECUl 
VAT  58.5 
Customs duties  32.5 
Agricultural levies  ·1  i 
Sugar levies  3.9 
Own resources  99,0 
Other revenue  1,0 I 
Total  100,0 
• Estimates In 1985 Community budget approved on  t3 June  t985. 
14 The Decision of  21 Apri/1970 
On 21 April 1970 after long and difficult negotiations, the six Community govern-
ments adopted a Decision on the replacement of  financial contributions from Mem-
ber States by the Communities' own resources, pursuant to Article 201 of the EEC 
Treaty (and by analogy Article 173 of the Euratom Treaty). As this Decision affec-
ted Member States' national budgets and finances, it had to be ratified by the natio-
nal  parliaments in  accordance  with  their respective  constitutional requirements. 
This implies that any alteration or extension of the Decision would be subject to the 
same difficult and protracted process of ratification. 
The Decision of 21 April1970 was in line with the resolutions laid down by the six 
Heads of State or Government at the Summit Conference in The Hague on 1 and 2 
December 1969. That conference also gave the go-ahead for negotiations on the 
enlargement of the Community to be opened with the United Kingdom, Denmark, 
Ireland and Norway (which was also an applicant at that stage). On the same occa-
sion a route was mapped out for achieving, in the common interest, the triple objec-
tive  of 'completion, consolidation and enlargement'. 'Completion' did not simply 
mean the end of the transitional period since the inception of the Treaties (1.  1. 
1958), but included the establishment of definitive financial arrangements for the 
common agricultural policy (financial solidarity). 
Although more than a decade has since passed, it is worth recalling what the six 
Heads of State or Government wrote in their final  communique of The Hague 
Conference: 
'They agree  to replace gradually,  within the framework  of this  financial 
arrangement, the contributions of member countries by  the Community's 
own resources,  taking into  account  all  the  interests concerned, with the 
object of achieving in due course the integral financing of the Communities' 
budgets in accordance with the procedure provided for in Article 201 of the 
Treaty establishing the EEC and of strengthening the budgetary powers of 
the European Parliament. 
The problem of direct elections will continue to be studied by the Council of 
Ministers. 
They have  asked the Governments to continue without delay, within the 
Council, the efforts already made to ensure a better control of the market by 
a policy of agricultural production making it possible to limit the burden on 
the budgets.' 
Negotiations on enlargement began on 30 June 1970, after most of the decisions 
announced in The Hague had been taken or set in train. This included the own 
resources Decision, on which agreement was reached on 7 February 1970 and which 
was signed on 21 April. 
15 Agricultural levies and customs duties 
That Decision triggered off a gradual transfer of receipts. Revenue from agricultural 
levies including the sugar levy was transferred to the Community from 1 January 
1971. The sugar levy consists of a levy charged on the production and storage of 
sugar and (since 1977) isoglucose in order to cover expenditure for market support. 
The sugar levy  is  a prefiguration of the co-responsibility levy for other products 
which is intended to contain outside financing for products in surplus. 
It was agreed that revenue from the Common Customs Tariff would be made over 
to the Community progressively, starting with 50% on 1 January 1971, and culmi-
nating in the complete transfer of customs revenue to the Community budget from 
16 1 January 1975 onwards. An exception was made for import duties on coal and 
steel products (see below). 
Agricultural levies reflect the difference between the Community price for a given 
product, and the world market price, so that import prices are brought up to the 
Community level. Agricultural prices, however, are not fixed at a high level in the 
Community merely to generate levy revenue. Other factors determine these prices; 
the effect on the Community's budget revenue will then vary according to the price 
levels  on world markets.  The yield  from  agricultural levies  depends entirely on 
movements in prices, trade and exchange rates. It does not follow a regular course 
either in relative or absolute terms and is therefore difficult to predict. 
Agricultural levies-plus any supplementary and compensatory amounts and other 
levies and premiums charged on trade in goods covered by the agricultural market 
organizations - and customs duties are the natural resources of the Community, 
since it is based on a single market with a common external frontier. However, they 
do not yield  anywhere near enough to supply the Community with the funds it 
requires for all the tasks assigned to it. Moreover, revenue from customs duties and 
agricultural levies  tends to fluctuate,  and its rate of growth falls  far  behind the 
Community's increasing financial needs. 
The relative importance of customs duties is diminishing as they are progressively 
dismantled in trade with non-member countries.  The Kennedy Round in GATT 
resulted in the Community reducing customs tariffs in trade with the outside world 
by. an average of 30% from 1967. The Tokyo Round will mean further tariff reduc-
tions of 33% on average between 1980 and 1987. Under the generalized system of 
preferences (GSP)  for developing countries many customs duties have either been 
removed altogether or sharply reduced. The Community's multilateral agreements 
(Lome), and bilateral preferential agreements (Mediterranean countries) have pro-
duced the same effect. Growing imports and rising prices barely make up for the 
worldwide reduction in customs duties. The alternative, however, would be a return 
to a policy of high tariffs and protectionism which the Community cannot afford as 
an industrial area dependent on exports (representing 25% of  its gross domestic pro-
duct, as against 13% in Japan and 8% in the United States). 
The Member States have to be repaid 10% of the revenue from customs duties and 
agricultural levies to cover collection costs. The Community budget is thus left with 
only 90%. At 1 105 million ECU, this 10% repayment amounted to as much as 
4.06% of expenditure in the 1984 budget. That was 386 million ECU-or 53%-
more than the Member States, through the Council, allocated for expenditure on 
research, energy and industry. 
17 Claim to a share of  value-added tax 
To meet all the Community's requirements an additional source of  finance had to be 
found. It was agreed in 1970 that the Member States should pay over part of their 
value-added tax revenue. VAT was chosen because - with the harmonization of 
turnover tax {VAT) systems under the Sixth Directive of 17 May 1977 - it is paid 
by  all  Community citizens and, being charged at the consumption stage, closely 
reflects Member States' economic capacities. The uniform basis of assessment used 
for the calculation of the share of Member States' VAT revenue to be made over to 
the Community is defined as 'the sum of  all taxable supplies of  goods and services to 
the final consumer in the Community'. It does not, therefore, depend on VAT rates 
charged, which still vary widely  between the Member States.  Harmonization of 
these rates remains an objective in the integration process, but will clearly take a 
long time.  Harmonization is  not essential for calculating the contribution to the 
Community budget. 
The 1% rate 
The Member States agreed to assign to the Community as own resources up to 1% 
of a uniform basis of assessment of value-added tax. This is a maximum rate which 
can be exceeded only if the Member States agree to amend the Decision of April 
1970 and the amendment is ratified by the national parliaments. 
There were delays in transposing the Sixth VAT Directive into national law. The 
replacement of the Member States' financial contributions by VAT payments, origi-
nally scheduled for 1978, was therefore deferred until1979. And even then the pro-
cess was not complete, since only Belgium, the United Kingdom, Denmark, France 
and the Netherlands had taken steps to comply with the Sixth Directive {Belgium on 
!January 1978, the United Kingdom on 1 April  1978, Denmark on 1 October 
1978, France on 1 January 1979 and the Netherlands on 1 January 1979). After 
proceedings had been initiated before the Court of  Justice, Ireland followed suit on 1 
March 1979, Italy on 1 July 1979 and Luxembourg and the Federal Republic of 
Germany on 1 January 1980. VAT own resources payments were therefore made in 
full for the first time in the 1980 budget. Greece, which joined the Community on 1 
January 1981 has been allowed until1 January 1986 to introduce the uniform VAT 
system. In the meantime it is paying financial contributions. 
In the 1984 budget the VAT call-in rate was first set at 0.9971% {of a possible 1%  ). 
However, the 1% limit was reached that autumn in the supplementary and amend-
ing budget. Increased expenditure had to be covered, and the estimate made the pre-
18 vious year of 1% of the Member States' uniform VAT bases (i. e. maximum VAT 
own resources for the Community) had to be revised downwards by 1.58% froin 
14 608.5 million ECU to 14 377.0 million ECU. 
The VAT call-in rate has risen relatively quickly: 
% 
1979  0.78 
1980  0.73 
1981  0.7868 
1982  0.9248 
1983  0.9980 
1984  1.0 
1985  0.98441 
1 May 1985. 
Future methods considered 
For some years the three-year financial forecasts attached to each year's preliminary 
draft budget had been indicating that the moment was drawing near when Com-
munity expenditure-if annual growth continued at the rates dictated by the rapid-
ly expanding needs of the agricultural policy - would no longer be covered by the 
more moderate increases in own resources. The MacDougall report (see above) in 
1977 and Commission papers had given early warning of this and had presented for 
discussion possible solutions for the financing problems looming ahead. Of particu-
lar significance in this context were - and indeed still are - the comprehensive 
review of the Community's budgetary problems, which the Commission sent to the 
Council (for a joint meeting of Foreign Ministers and Finance Ministers) and Parlia-
ment in March 1978, and the Green Paper 'Financing the Community budget-the 
way ahead', which it sent to the Council in November 1978. 
Calls to raise the 1% VAT ceiling were already coming from various quarters. In a 
resolution passed on 9 April1981, the European Parliament held that 'raising the 
ceiling on VAT above the 1% limit remains the most appropriate measure', and that 
abolition of the ceiling was the 'most advisable solution'. The potential 'net contri-
butors' among the Member States,  however,  stoutly opposed such  a possibility, 
because their own tight budget situation would inevitably mean raising domestic 
VAT rates. In addition, the feeling, particularly in Bonn and London, was that the 
necessary savings resulting from a reform of  the agricultural policy and its financing 
19 arrangements would not be achieved on a lasting basis if the constraint imposed by 
the VAT limit were to be eased. 
At the Stuttgart summit conference of the Heads of State or Government of the 10 
Member States in June 1983 it was eventually decided to raise the limit from 1% to 
1.4%. Hopes were pinned on the tighter budgetary discipline also called for at the 
Stuttgart summit. However, in agreeing to the increase in the limit to 1.4%, the Ger-
man Chancellor, Helmut Kohl, had the condition written into the final declaration 
that it would be ratified by the national parliaments at the same time as the treaties 
for Spanish and Portuguese accession. 
It was then found that even without enlargement the Community's activities and 
expenditure would lead to budgetary deficits unless the VAT limit were raised. The 
following decision was therefore taken at the Fontainebleau European Council in 
June 1984: 
20 
'The maximum rate of mobilization of VAT will  be  1.4% on 1 January 
1986; this maximum rate applies to every Member State and will enter into 
force as soon as the ratification procedures are completed, and by 1 January 
1986 at the latest. The maximum rate may be increased to 1.6% on 1 January 1988 by unanim-
ous decision of the Council and after agreement has been given in accordance 
with national procedures.' 
The Commission's proposals, however, had been much more ambitious. In May 
1983 it had called for a new decision to replace the Council Decision of 21  April 
1970 (see above) which was still in force. This new decision would remove the VAT 
ceiling altogether and would enable the Community institutions themselves to call in 
the VAT revenue they needed without a further decision having to be ratified in 
accordance with national constitutional requirements. 
This would give the Community direct control over a tax and would make it finan-
cially independent. In return, the need for a unanimous decision would be a definite 
guarantee for Member States that they would still have a role to play. The second 
requirement envisaged by the Commission was a Parliament decision by a majority 
of its members and three-fifths of the votes cast. However, the governments have 
not accepted this proposal nor the modulation of VAT rates suggested by the Com-
mission.  Modulation was an ingenious arrangement for overcoming certain bud-
getary imbalances. As the Thorn Commission stated in the review of its activities 
(Working/or Europe-January 1981-January 1985, p. 33), it was 'well received 
by those Member States for which it would have meant a reduced contribution to 
the budget, although they would have liked it to go further, but is was rejected out 
of hand by those which would have had to pay more. In a zero-sum game, the need 
for unanimity inevitably results in stalemate. 
After further unsuccessful attempts, the Commission had to abandon the search for 
agreement on a new method of sharing out the budgetary burden among the Mem-
ber States'. The Commission interpreted this as  a demonstration of the Member 
States' lack of confidence in the future of the Community  .. 
'This is hardly surprising in view of the persistent crisis which has so divided 
the  Community,  paralysed  its  decision-making  mechanism  and  kept  the 
attention of  the Heads of  State or Government riveted for four years on petti-
fogging haggles over money' (  op.cit., p. 34  ). 
However, problems of  this type have beset the Communities from their infancy whe-
never it has been suggested that they should receive a special tax to give them finan-
cial independence. The first Community - the European Coal and Steel Commun-
ity (ECSC)- was given this financial independence in 1951 in the form of a levy. 
The conflict which specialist literature describes as the ECSC tax battle broke out in 
1953. This is perhaps why, when the EEC and the EAEC (Euratom) Treaties were 
drafted in  1957, the financial  provisions of the ECSC Treaty were ignored (see 
Wohlfahrt-Everling-Glaesner-Sprung). 
21 First European tax: the ECSC levy 
The first real Community tax was introduced when the European Coal and Steel 
Community, the first of the three Communities, was established by the Treaty of 18 
April  1951. Under Article 49, the High Authority -now the Commission - is 
empowered to procure the funds it requires to carry out its tasks by imposing a levy 
on the production of coal and steel. The Commission itself can establish the levy's 
basis of assessment and rate. The levies are assessed annually on the various pro-
ducts according to their average value. The System developed by the High Authority 
is similar to the VAT system. The ECSC levy is paid by firms in the coal and steel 
industries. The levy rate was 0.35% in the 1960s; it was subsequently reduced to 
0.30%, and from 1972 to 1979, to 0.29%. Since  1980 it has been 0.31 %. It is 
made up of a net scale - recalculated every year - for each tonne of brown coal, 
hard coal, pig iron, steel in ingots and rolled steel products. Steel firms account for 
three-quarters of the levy yield and coal firms for the other quarter. 
Mention ought to be made here of  two peculiarities which have outlived the 'merger' 
of the institutions (see below): customs revenue from duties on imports covered by 
the ECSC Treaty is not available for ECSC purposes but still accrues to the Member 
States. Because the ECSC operating budget is governed by its own rules and proce-
dures under the ECSC Treaty, it has always been executed and presented separately 
from the general Community budget. Here too, there is need for reform. The Com-
mission has often proposed that customs duties on coal and steel  should also be 
made over to the Community. 
So far, this has not been the case. The amount involved is now around 60 million 
ECU, i.e. only about half the 122.5 million ECU which had to be transferred from 
the general budget to the ECSC operating budget (359.5 million ECU) in 1985 to 
finance the social and conversion measures connected with the restructuring of the 
coal and steel industries. 
The search for other sources of Community finance has raised the question of an 
energy tax or a tax on imports of unprocessed fats (nicknamed the margarine tax) or 
on all fats along the lines of the sugar levy (coresponsibility levy). The possibility of 
claiming a share of taxes on tobacco or petrol - which might have to be increased 
for the purpose- has also been investigated, but no serious discussions or prepara-
tions have followed. 
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w 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Germany 
Greece 
France 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
United Kingdom 
Total 
1 May 1985. 
Sugar and 
isoglucose 
levies 
15 680 000 
35 400 000 
266 600 000 
21  200 000 
346 000 000 
14 800 000 
69 320 000 
-
79 430 000 
78 500 000 
986 930 000 
Summary of financing of expenditure 
FmanciaJ year 1985 
1 
Agricultural  O:Jmmon  Financial contri-
levies  Customs Tariff  butions Current 
duties  financial year 
278 400 000  468 000 000 
5 800 000  190 000 000 
190 000 000  2 340 000 000 
41300 000  137 500 000  259 726127 
90 000 000  1164 000 000 
5 500 000  125 100 000 
342 100 000  805 000 000 
150 000  4 600 000 
154 600 000  705 000 000 
280 000 000  2 157 000 000 
1387 850 000  8 096 200 000  259 726127 
VAT own resour-
ces Current  Total 
financial year 
546 626 040  1368 706 040 
337 717 474  568 917 474 
4 624 451501  7 421 051 501 
- 459 726 127 
3 734 375 918  5 334 375 918 
146 777 210  292 177 210 
2 466 311 748  3 682 731 748 
43 297 112  48 047 112 
812 362 066  1751392 066 
2 248 470 501  4 763 970 501 
14 960 389 570  25 691 095 697 Structure of revenue for financing expenditure in the 1984 budget (%) 
('000 ECU) 
Sugar  Agricultural  Customs  Total  VAT  Total  \984 
le'v'ies  levies  dut!es  GOP 
1  2  3  1-3  4  1-4 
1 225  280  +  1 946 650  + 7 883  500  •  11  055 430  +  14  393  858  - 25  449  288  2 642 000 000 
A.  Breakdown by Member State  (%) 
B  7.49  \5.99  5 93  7.8  3.45  5.28  3.47 
OK  3 81  0.51  2.47  2 3  2 00  2.13  2.52 
D  28.14  14.44  28.98  26.4  28.76  28  07  28.51 
GR  1.76  4.94  1.22  1 9  1.53  1.71  1.50 
F  34.19  6 93  13.74  14.8  22.79  19 00  22.14 
IRL  1.39  0.3.1  1.57  1.3  0 86  1.11  0.76 
IT  7.02  23.12  9.08  11.3  15.33  13 67  15.43 
L  0.00  0.01  0.08  0.1  0.25  0 20  0.14 
NL  8.17  12.69  9 35  98  4.93  7.16  5.49 
UK  8.03  21.06  27.58  24.3  20.05  21.67  19.49 
EUR 10  100  100  100  100  100  100  100 
B.  Breakdown In each  Member State 
%  '000 ECU 
B  6.83  +  23.18  +  34.77  . 64.78  +  35.22  •  100.00  1 342 945 
OK  8.61  +  1.85  +  36  01  . 46.47  +  53.53  •  100.00  541  475 
D  4.83  +  3.94  +  32.00  . 40  77  +  59.83  •  100.00  7 141118 
GR  4.96  +  22.06  +  '22.03  . 49 05  +  50.95  •  100.00  435  707 
F  8.67  +  2.79  +  22.40  . 33.86  +  66.14  •  100.00  4 835  177 
IRL  6 02  +  2.12  +  43.83  -
51.97  +  48.03  •  100.00  282 908 
IT  2.47  +  12.93  +  20.58  - 35 98  +  64 02  •  100.00  3 479 369 
l  0.00  +  0.29  +  12.52  - 12.81  +  87.19  •  100.00  51  913 
Nl  5.50  +  13.56  +  40.44  -
59.50  +  40.50  •  100.00  1 892 327 
UK  1.78  +  7.43  +  39.41  .  48.62  +  51.38  •  100.00  5 516 348 
EUR 10  4.80  +  7.65  +  30.98  -
43.43  +  56.57  •  100.00  25  449 288 
1 Expenditure to be linanced  25  449  288 355 ECU 
3 Outiesandlevies(t-3)  - 11  055 430  COO ECU 
4 VAT required:  14  393 858  355 ECU  •  1% 
2 + surplus  +  207  298  607ECU 
25 656  586  962  ECU 
Other revenue  1 592  040  760 ECU 
Total budget volume  27  248  627  722 ECU 
Sourct: OJ l329. 17.  12.  1984, pp. 26- 28 and p.  5. 
24 C. Non-budgetary sources of finance 
The Community has made use of various financing instruments outside the budget, 
exploiting the first-class name it enjoys as a borrower on the capital markets. 
ECSC borrowing and lending operations are the main source of additional finance 
provided for under the ECSC Treaty. Ever since 1954 the Community has been con-
stantly raising capital for on-lending to coal and steel firms. At 31 December 1984 it 
had raised a total of 9 726 million ECU. In 1984 firms drew 825.5 million ECU 
from this facility and 863.7 million ECU in new loans had to be raised. 
Euratom borrowing and lending operations were provided for in the 1957 Treaty 
establishing Euratom, but they were not activated until1977. The funds are used to 
help in financing investment projects for the industrial production of electricity in 
nuclear plants, and for industrial installations of  the fuel cycle, in order to reduce the 
Community's dependence on imported energy. At the end of 1984 loans for that 
purpose totalled around 1 840 million ECU. In 1982 the Council raised the authori-
zed loan volume to 2 000 million ECU. 
In 1975, after the first oil price shock, the Community introduced another borrow-
ing and lending facility: the 'Community loan instrument'. This was to help Member 
States cope with balance-of-payment problems resulting from higher oil prices. 
After initial operations involving 1 600 million ECU in  1975 and 1976, France 
drew 4 000 million ECU from this instrument in 1983. In 1984 the Council increa-
sed the volume of the instrument to 8 000 million ECU and restricted the propor-
tion which could be drawn by any one Member State to 50%. 
For momentary tight spots discreet standby arrangements between the central banks 
come  into  play  within  the  European  Monetary  System  (EMS).  For short-term 
monetary support creditor quotas up to 16 100 million ECU can  be mobilized. 
Medium-term financial assistance is available up to 14 370 million ECU. 
In 1978 a New Community Instrument (NCI) was created to meet immediate speci-
fic financial needs required for achieving greater convergence. The purpose of this 
instrument (also known as  the 'Ortoli facility'  after its inventor) is  to contribute 
towards financing investments which make for greater convergence and integration 
25 in Member States' economic policies. Such projects must be in line with the Com-
munity's priority objectives in the field of energy, industry and infrastructure. First 
and foremost they must aid regional development and help reduce unemployment. 
The first tranches of 500 million ECU each were approved in 1979 (NCI I)  and 
1980 (NCI II). In 1983 the borrowing ceiling (NCI III) was raised to 3 000 million 
ECU. In July 1984 the Council authorized a second tranche of 1 400 million ECU 
to promote investment projects, mainly by small and medium-sized businesses. In 
1984loans of 1 181.8 million ECU were granted from NCI I-III, 67.3% of them for 
the development of small and medium-sized businesses. 
Another source of finance outside the Community budget is the European Invest-
ment Bank (EIB). In size and scope, it is the largest non-budgetary instrument. Bet-
ween  its  establishment in  1958, under Article  129 of the  EEC Treaty, and 31 
December 1984 the Bank raised some 37 000 million ECU, mainly by means of 
issues on the capital market, and on-lent the proceeds. Well over half of these loans 
-more than 20 000 million ECU- were granted between 1981 and 1984. The 
Bank's capital (subscribed by the Member States) now totals 14 400 million ECU. 
Under its Statute, the Bank can provide loans and guarantees for up to 36 000 mill-
ion ECU (250% of the subscribed capital). 
Following the loans of 5 600 million ECU granted in 1984, this limit will be virtu-
ally reached in 1985. 
l-oans granted 
New Community Instrument (NCI) 1 
EEC balance-of-payments loans 1 
ECSC
2 
Euratom 1 
EIB (fromt the Dank's own resources) 3 
of which: loans to A CP countries 
loans to Mediterranean countries 4 
1 With guarantee from the general budget. 
2 With guarantee from the ECSC budget. 
' With guarantee from Elfl capital. 
• With guarantee from the general budget for 75% of the sums lent. 
5 Including 71.8 million ECU lent outside the Community. 
Total 
1982 
791.1 
-
740.6~ 
361.8 
3 863.4 
(122.2) 
(288.0) 
5 756.9 
millionECU 
1983  1984 
1 211.8  1 181.8 
4 247.3  -
778.1  825.5 
366.6  186.0 
4 682.9  5 633.8 
(90.0)  (79.1) 
(337.2)  (541.6) 
11  286.7  7 827.1 
The footnotes show the extent to which these non-budgetary sources of finance are 
backed by guarantees in the Community and ECSC budgets. 
26 The specific  financial  instruments for  the  66 ACP  countries (Africa,  Caribbean, 
Pacific) are the Development Fttnds based on Article 132 of the EEC Treaty. The 
resources for these five-year Funds (currently Lome III-1985-90) are provided by 
additional contributions from the Member States according to a specific scale: 
1st EDF 1958-63  581 million u.a. 
2nd EDF 1964-71  800 million u.a. 
3rd EDF 1971-75  900 million u.a. 
4th EDF 1975-80  3 000 million u.a. 
5th EDF 1980-85  4 542 million u.a. 
6th EDF 1985-90  7 400 million u.a. 
In addition, the EIB grants the ACP countries loans on special terms from its own 
funds as part of the cooperation under the Lome Convention. It provided 390 mill-
ion u.a. for 1975-80, 685 million ECU for 1980-85 and this will rise to 1 100 mill-
ion ECU for 1985-90. 
In order to command a unified and comprehensive budget the European Parliament 
and the Commission would like to have these special sources of  finance (hut not the 
EIB) incorporated in the general budget. The Governments meeting in the Council 
have so far been unwilling to accept this. They have, however, agreed that the Com-
mission should provide general information regarding the various categories of bor-
rowing and lending operations (capital operations and debt management) in  an 
annex to the budget (most recently in the general budget for 1984, OJ L 12, 16. 1. 
1984, pages 955-1039). 
27 D. Development of Community finances 
Since the ECSC was founded in 1952 and the EEC and EAEC in 1958 the budget 
and financial systems have developed considerably. At the present time, with a fur-
ther enlargement of the Community imminent and the need to use available resourc-
es  to meet the financial  needs of all Member States in  such a way as  to promote 
integration more effectively, adjustments to the system and its mechanisms are being 
considered. Although most governments are reluctant to give the Community the 
means for making genuine progress in this direction, the directly elected Members of 
the European Parliament are determined to have a greater say in the establishment 
and control of the Community budget and in the Community's financial activities in 
general. If need be, they will fight for this. 
The ECSC Treaty went  furthest 
The ECSC benefited from the favourable tide of  strong pro-European sentiment pre-
valent when it was established in the early 1950s. The oldest of the three Commu-
nities, it has financial  provisions which, with own resources in the form of tax 
revenue (levy) and the power to raise loans as well, go a long way on the road to 
integration as regards the institutional arrangements in general and the financial 
arrangements proper. 
EEC and Euratom - identical financial systems with 
different scales 
The financial provisions contained in the Treaties establishing the European Econo-
mic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (EAEC or 
Euratom) are largely similar as regards principles and budgetary procedure. The 
only differences in the two systems are in their different functions and scales of con-
tributions. 
29 The Euratom Treaty established two budgets- an administrative budget and an 
investment budget. A total of 72.93 million u.a. flowed through the administrative 
budget between 1958 and the merger of the Communities in  1967. The sum of 
731.5  million  u.a.  (known  as  commitment  appropriations)  went  to  long-term 
research programmes via the research budgets. 
Financial contributions and the weighting of  votes in the Council were fixed at diffe-
rent levels: 
Administrative budget  Investment budget 
•'  /0  I 
votes  %  I 
votes 
Delgium  7.9  2  9.9  9 
France  28.0  4  30.0  30 
FR of Germany  28.0  4  30.0  30 
Italy  28.0  4  23.0  23 
Luxembourg  0.2  1  0.2  1 
Netherlands  7.9  2  6.9  7 
Although Article 173 of the Euratom Treaty allows Member States' financial con-
tributions to be replaced by the proceeds of levies, as in the ECSC, no use has ever 
been made of this possibility. 
The general authorization to raise loans (contained in Article 172(4) of the EAEC 
Treaty) has no parallel in the EEC Treaty. It was first used by the Commission at the 
beginning of 1975 when a proposal was made to the Council. See page 25 for the 
current situation. 
EEC- a single budget 
The financial provisions of the EEC Treaty envisaged a single budget for all revenue 
and all administrative and operational expenditure. Only the Development Fund for 
granting financial aid to Member States' former overseas territories was placed out-
side the budget. 
The scale set by the EEC Treaty for contributions to the administrative budget diffe-
red from that for contributions to the Social Fund (a separate title in the budget), but 
the weighting of votes in the Council was the same. 
30 Administrative  Social 
budget  Fund  Votes 
%  % 
Belgium  7.9  8.8  2 
France  28.0  32.0  4 
FR of Germany  28.0  32.0  4 
Italy  28.0  20.0  4 
Luxembourg  0.2  0.2  1 
Netherlands  7.9  7.0  2 
Before the merger of the three Communities in 1967, the EEC budget at first grew at 
a normal rate dictated by the expansion of the administrative machinery and the ini-
tial Social Fund operations. The launching of the common agricultural policy in 
1964led to an explosion of expenditure. 
31 The Community's operating expenditure 
in million u.a. 
Administrative  Social  Agricultural 
budget  Fund  Fund 
1958-1964  156.3  110.0  -
1965  34.5  19.6  102.6 
1966  42.5  21.6  300.7 
1967  46.7  19.8  537.4 
The European unit of  account 
Until1977 the budget was drawn up and implemented in units of account (u.a.). 
The unit of account was the equivalent of 0.88867088 grams of fine gold, the gold 
content of the US dollar from 1934 to 1972. 
Between 1978 and 1980 the budget was drawn up and implemented in European 
units of account (EUA). Like its successor, the ECU, the EUA was based on a basket 
of Community  currencies.  The individual  currencies  are  weighted  according to 
objective economic criteria (Member States' shares of the Community's gross domes-
tic product, shares of intra-European trade and shares (quotas) in the short-term 
monetary support arrangements). The weighting of each currency in the basket was 
adjusted after the first review on 15 September 1984. 
Currency basket 
Relative shares%  1 ECU comprises 
Untill4. 9.1984 I  From IS. 9.1984  Untill4. 9. 1984  I  From IS. 9. 1984 
FR of Germany  27.3  32.0  0.828  0.719  DM 
France  19.5  19.0  1.15  1.310  FF 
United Kingdom  17.5  15.0  0.0885  0.0878  UKL 
Italy  14.0  10.2  109.0  140.0  LIT 
Netherlands  9.0  10.1  0.286  0.256  HFL 
Belgium  7.9  8.2  3.66  3.71  DFR 
Luxembourg  0.3  0.3  0.14  0.14  LFR 
Denmark  3.0  2.7  0.217  0.219  DKR 
Ireland  1.5  1.2  0.0076  0.0087  IRL 
Greece  - 1.3  - 1.15  DR 
100.0  100.0  1ECU  1 ECU 
32 Conversion rates 
Former budget unit  European unit of account  ECU 
of  account 
(until1977)  (I. 2.  1977)  I 
(I. 2. 1978)  (14.3.1979)  I 
(I. 2. 1985) 
DM  3.66  2.68845  2.59338  2.51532  2.22431 
FF  5.55419  5.55215  5.82906  5.78997  6.79767 
UKL}  0.416667  0.651186  0.629926  0.66244  0.62127 
IRL  0.66244  0.71509 
LIT  625  985.667  1064.46  1142.25  1371.27 
HFL  3.62  2.81381  2.77819  . 2.71424  2.51584 
DFR/LFR  50  41.3015  40.1924  39.8183  44.5370 
DKR  7.50  6.69738  7.01307  7.01972  7.93610 
DR  - - - - 90.9416 
USD  1.20635  1.11739  1.22800  1.35138  0.70079 
Tho  ECU  Is tho sum of tho 
following amounts of national 
currencies: 
One  ECU  comprises the following 
percentages of national currencies: 
DKR  0,219 
OM  0,719 
DR  1,15 
BFR  3,71 
FF  1,31 
HFL  0,256 
IRL  0,00871 
LFR  0,14 
UT  140 
UKL  0,0878 
(as of 17 September,  1984, following the Inclusion of the Greek drachma In the EcufF 
The rates for converting the ECU Into Member 
State currencies are calculated and published 
daily. 
On  1 July, 1985,  one  ECU  was worth: 
From EUA to ECU 
DKR  8.07421 
OM  2.25024 
DR  100.148 
BFR  45.3136 
FF  6.85826 
DKR 
HFL  2.53655 
IRL  0.718060 
LFR  45.3136 
LIT  1 436.74 
UKL  0.564991 
When the European Monetary System (EMS) was set up  on 13 March 1979 the 
EUA was superseded by the ECU. ECU is the abbreviation for European currency 
33 unit, but it is also the name of a coin that circulated in France in the Middle Ages-
the ecu. In 1979/80 the ECU replaced the EUA for all legal and financial purposes 
in the Community, and from 1 January 19  81, it has been the unit used in the budget 
as well. 
The value of the ECU is worked out by the Commission each day for the individual 
currencies on the basis of the market exchange rates at the close of trading. The 
equivalent of the ECU in each Member State's currency is calculated on the basis of 
the official rates of these currencies on the market of the country in question. The 
ECU  rates are  available e;1ch  day from  the Commission at 15.30 hours by telex 
(Brussels 237 89, selector code ecce), and published in the Official Journal of the 
European Communities (Series C) on the following day. 
The ECU rates reflect the relationship between the exchange rates of the Member 
States' currencies (and of the currencies of the other OECD countries whose rates 
are also published daily in the Commission's quotation list) at any given time. 
The Community budget for any given year is drawn up using the rates at 1 February 
of the previous year, this being the date when the preparatory work on the budget 
begins. Thus, the exchange rates on 1 February 1984 were used for the 1985 budget 
and those on 1 February 1985 for the 1986 budget. 
Difficulties with currencies and monetary compensation 
The introduction of the European Monetary System (EMS) and the ECU in 1979 
brought to an end the period of uncertainty caused by currency upheavals and fluc-
tuating exchange rates that began when the convertibility of the US  dollar in gold 
was suspended in August 1971. The Community had to try and solve the particular-
ly complicated problems of mathematics, conversion and evaluation which resulted 
and experimented with such things as the 'snake in the tunnel' (1972) and block 
floating ('the snake') from 1973. Its task was made more difficult by the fact that 
France in particular had to withdraw from the snake on a number of occasions. 
In the agricultural sector, a system of compensation at frontiers (monetary compen-
satory amounts - MCAs) had to be introduced to cope with these problems. This 
was necessary as the common prices for about 80% of agricultural products are uni-
formly expressed in ECU. Any change in exchange rates or adjustment of central 
. rates therefore has a direct effect on the market organization prices which have to be 
converted  into  each  national  currency.  Revaluation  decreases  and  devaluation 
increases  the guaranteed support prices  in  the country involved.  The system  of 
34 monetary compensatory amounts was introduced in  May 1971  to mitigate these 
effects which jeopardize the unity of the common market. Under the system, repre-
sentative rates ('green' rates) were introduced which differ from the official exchange 
rates. Discussions of the monetary compensatory amounts caused major problems 
in the annual farm price negotiations, since, with the change in the value of the green 
rates, the price increases had different effects on prices in the individual countries. 
Prices went up more in countries with a weak currency and negative MCAs and less 
in countries with a strong currency and positive MCAs. The system of agricultural 
MCAs is  extremely complicated.  A much simplified example will  show what is 
involved: 
The Community price for market organization product X has been fixed at a uni-
form 100 ECU. At the time this corresponded in national currencies to DM 235 or 
FF 670. Revaluation of the German mark and devaluation of  the French franc chan-
ged these amounts to DM 225 and FF 690. The guaranteed producer prices would 
therefore fall by DM 10 in the Federal Republic and rise by FF 20 in France. Repre-
sentative green rates of DM 230 and FF 680 would therefore be fixed for the remain-
35 der of the marketing year. In cross-border trade in agricultural products there would 
have to be positive compensation of DM 5 and negative compensation of FF 10 to 
neutralize in the agricultural sector the effect of the change in central rates which had 
been made deliberately as a result of economic policy. 
This system of MCAs also proved to be a considerable burden on the Community 
budget. Although, because positive MCAs increased revenue and negative MCAs 
increased expenditure, only the balances were of significance, they still represented a 
cost of one-tenth or more of total Guarantee expenditure. In addition, there were 
the uncertainties arising from the impossibility of forecasting currency trends when 
drawing up the preliminary draft budget. 
A new system of monetary compensation was agreed in the agricultural price deci-
sions for 1984/85, leading to a large-scale dismantling and elimination of positive 
MCAs. The main principle underlying the new system was the agreement that, when 
exchange rates changed, the strongest currency in the EMS, i.e. the currency with 
the highest revaluation rate, would be used as a basis for establishing the new 'green 
rates' and the monetary compensatory amounts. Past experience would suggest that 
this will be the German mark for the foreseeable future. Sterling will not be conside-
red as long as it floats outside the EMS with 2.25% margins. 
A green central rate was established by the decisions of 31 March 1984. This replac-
es the EMS central rates in calculating the MCAs and is obtained by multiplying it 
by the monetary factor of 1.033651. The green central rate for the Federal Republic 
- 2.31728 - is  obtained by multiplying the ECU central  rate of 2.24184 by 
1.033651. The establishment of the green central rate is normally equivalent to a 
3.3651% revaluation of the ECU in the agricultural sector, with a corresponding 
effect on the levies raised and refunds paid. 
Financing the common agricultural policy: the stages 
Regulation No 25 of 4 April1962 on the financing of the common agricultural poli-
cy is the basis of the policy itself. It originated during the first and, so far, the longest 
agricultural marathon in Brussels, which lasted from mid-December 1961 to 14  Jan-
uary 1962 with short interruptions (the device of the 'stopped clock' was used enabl-
ing decisions taken after the specified date to be deemed to have been taken at the 
proper time). The debate ended with the approval of the regulations on the first agri-
cultural market organizations. 
Here it must be remembered that the problem of balancing interests, which is com-
ing more and more to the fore, is in reality as old as the integration process itself, 
36 and played a major role in determining the mode of financing agriculture. France 
was particularly keen on this first step towards financial solidarity in agriculture 
('we are doomed to succeed'), but Germany, with its interest in the industrial mar-
ket, managed to ensure that Regulation No 25 of 1962 on the financing of the com-
mon agricultural policy was accompanied by Regulation No 17 of the same year-
the first regulation implementing Article 85 of the EEC Treaty, and bringing the 
competition policy into practice. 
On 15 December 1964 the Council established common cereal prices and the prin-
ciple of financial solidarity among the Member States. The Commission was asked 
to submit implementing rules for a common system to finance agricultural policy. 
The proposals published in April1965 were relatively far-reaching for their time. In 
particular, the proposals for 'democratic control of own resources' by increasing the 
budgetary powers of the European Parliament (then consisting of delegated mem-
bers) prompted General de Gaulle to block Council activities for seven months from 
30 June 1965 (the 'empty seat crisis'). 
After this crisis was resolved, the question of 'a definitive financial arrangement for 
the common agricultural policy' was dropped. But the Treaty merging the institu-
tions of the three Communities was ratified, and took effect on 1 July 1967. 
The merger 
The Councils and executives of the three Communities became 'common institu-
tions' when the three Communities were merged. The legal bases were partly stan-
dardized, as can be seen from Article 20 of the Merger Treaty, which incorporated 
the administrative expenditure of the three Communities in a common EEC budget 
in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Treaty. 
Definitive financial arrangements 
The need to fix  the details of the definitive stage of Community finance  became 
more  urgent with the approach of the  end of the  transitional period set  for  31 
December 1969 by the EEC Treaty and subsequent agricultural regulations. After 
months of negotiations in the Council in the second half of 1969, the breakthrough 
came at The Hague Conference of 1 and 2 December of that year (see above, 'Deci-
sion of 21 April 1970'). 
37 The European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee 
Fund (EAGGF) grows 
1973 
3 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
4 
1982 
1983 
1984 
Guarantee Section 
I 
3 806 
3 513 
3 980 
5 587.1 
6 830.4 
8 672.7 
10 387.1 
11  291.9 
11063.7 
12 260.0 
15 785.8 
18 330.8 
Expt"nditurt In million u.a. 
Guidance Section 
l 
123.7 
128.4 
184.3 
218.2 
296.7 
323.6 
403.4 
603.1 
576.4 
650.0 
728.0 
676.2 
1 Guarantee Sect inn responsible for financing export refunds and interventions to regulate 
internal markets (storage, etc.). 
'  Guidance Seclion responsible for granling Community aid for the financing of projects to 
improve agricuhuraf structures in the Memher States. 
3 Enlarged Community from 1973. 
4 For the nine Member States. 
We obtain a mirror imge of the increasing trend of Community agricultural spend-
ing  when we  consider the impact on national budgets.  The very  clear financial 
reports from the German Federal Ministry of Finance show that in the 1965 federal 
budget expenditure on agriculture was DM 1 522 million, or 2.37% of the total 
budget ofDM 64 162 million. In 1975 it was down to DM 786 million, or 0.5% of 
a national budget which by now had risen by 144% to DM 156 894 million. In the 
1984 German budget the same agricultural expenditure items are allocated DM 766 
million, which is 0.29% of a total that has now risen to DM 257 143 million. 
However, page 37 of the 1984 Financial Report shows that DM 6 734 million from 
the EAGGF Guarantee Section went to German agriculture. As the Ministry laconi-
cally states, 'substantial areas of agriculture policy, and especially market organiza-
tions, are now regulated and financed by the EEC'. 
At 67.28% in the 1984 budget and probably around 68% in the 1985 budget, the 
proportion of expenditure devoted to agriculture is still extremely high. This is not 
only because agricultural policy is still the only fully integrated sector, i.e. financed 
by the Community on the basis of joint decisions. It must also be borne in mind that 
some of this expenditure results from the options and decisions under the Commun-
ity's  foreign  economic policy  and trade policy.  These  include  the commitments 
38 assumed towards Commonwealth countries when the United Kingdom joined-the 
purchase of 1.3 million tonnes of sugar a year from the ACP countries and the gua-
ranteed market in the UK  for New Zealand butter und cheese. Another factor of 
financial significance is the promise made as a commercial concession to the USA to 
restrict the Community's wheat exports, which pushes up storage costs. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  price-balancing  role  of the  Community's  agricultural 
arrangements protects consumers from the effects of extreme world market fluctua-
tions and guarantees steady consumer prices and a regular and secure supply. This 
may not appear to be a problem at present in view of the current surpluses, espe-
cially in cereals and milk, but that does not rule out the need for a safety net. 
39 E. Enlargement 
Community established on 1 January 1958: Belgium,  France,  Germany,  Italy, 
First enlargement 1 January 1973: 
Second enlargement 1 January 1981: 
Luxembourg, Netherlands. 
Denmark, Ireland, United Kingdom. 
Greece. 
The common agricultural policy and the way it is  financed did not play such an 
important role in the 1971  and 1972 entry negotiations as in the negotiations in 
41 1962 and January 1963.  The main reason  was  the  United Kingdom's decision, 
before negotiations began in 1971, to abandon-because of its excessive cost-the 
deficiency payments system so stubbornly defended in the 1962 negotiations and to 
adapt its agricultural policy to the Community system. 
This obviated the need for tough negotiations like those conducted in 1962 on agri-
cultural finance.  All  that was required was tideover and special provisions for a 
number of specific problems. 
On the financial  front the three new Member States requested and were granted a 
transitional period before having to make full financial contributions. The arrange-
ments were set out in Article 131 of the Act of Accession. 
All  kinds of mathematical formulas had to be worked out for this.  In view of the 
political repercussions which such measures were certain to have, compromises oft-
en had to be sought, even at European Council level. The nine Heads of Govern-
ment agreed in  Dublin in March 1975 on a corrective mechanism to be put into 
effect  if  a country's contributions were  to undergo  an  unwarranted increase.  In 
December 1977, the European Council settled the disputes arising from the applica-
tion and interpretation of Article 131 of the act of Accession in the 1978 and 1979 
budgets. 
Transitional periods and 'dynamic brakes' 
Between  1971  and 1977, the Member States' financial  participation in  the own 
resources system was gradually increased by means of the 'relative share' formula. 
Their annual contribution could only differ from that of the previous financial year 
within the limits of a  + 1% to  -1.5% between 1971  and 1974, and by approxi-
mately 2% either way between 1975 and 1977. These 'dynamic brakes' were remo-
ved in the 1978 financial year. The Heads of State or Government agreed in Decem-
ber 1977 that-instead of applying Article 131-financial compensations would, 
if required, be made in 1978 and 1979 outside the budget framework. 
This decision was also appropriate in the light of the transition from GNP-based 
financial contributions to VAT  -based contributions calculated according to objec-
tive criteria, i.e. a Community budget financed solely by own resources, and in view 
of the changeover from the old unit of account (u.a.)- which was tied to gold and 
the dollar- to the new European unit of account (EUA). It was not until the diffe-
rences in interpretation of Article 131 of the Act of Accession had been settled that 
the Heads of State or Government decided on this line of approach. 
42 Financial mechanisms 
Shortly after the accession of the United Kingdom,  Ireland and Denmark at the 
beginning of 1973 it was realized that the objectives and machinery of Community 
finance, originally tailored to the six founder States, would not give full satisfaction 
in  the enlarged Community. Denmark, whose original  agricultural position was 
such that in the early years of Community membership it was top of  the league of  net 
beneficiaries, accepted the situation with grateful but silent thanks. Ireland, on the 
other hand, emerged as a net beneficiary only after decisions had been taken on spe-
cial measures for it. As early as 1974, on the other hand, the United Kingdom found 
it had reason to complain. It  regarded the way the own resources system operated as 
unfair, and demanded a closer relationship between payments and receipts. That 
was the basis for its call for 'renegotiation', and the European Council in Dublin in 
March 1975 agreed on a corrective mechanism (the financial mechanism), to apply 
for an experimental period of seven years beginning in 1976. The mechanism is acti-
vated in specified circumstances where a Member State finds itself in a 'special eco-
nomic situation'. 
The mechanism, however, was never adequate, for it never removed or reduced the 
United Kingdom's net debit balance, or even slowed down its growth. The situation 
grew worse in  1979. At the end of 1979 Parliament even rejected the 1980 draft 
budget (see below). 
The mandate of  30 May 1980 
The problem hampered decision-making in the Council and was raised at several 
European Councils.  On 30 May 1980, five  weeks after negotiations had broken 
down at the European Council in Luxembourg on 27 and 28 April, the Council 
reached  a broad-based compromise.  Following its customary style of adopting a 
package of measures, it set farm prices for 1980  I 81, adopted the sheepmeat regula-
tions, devised a fisheries policy, and agreed on necessary improvements in the agri-
cultural policy, all against the backdrop of a formula for settling 'the British prob-
lem'. It was only then that the 1980 budget was adopted on 9 July 1980. 
In the Council conclusions of 30 May 1980 on the United Kingdom's contribution 
to the financing of the Community budget (Official Journal C 158, 27. 6. 1980) it 
was agreed that the net British contribution, which for 1980 and 1981 would come 
to an aggregate 3 924 million EUA, would be reduced by 2 585 million EUA to 
1 339 million EUA. All the other Member States would contribute to this relief for 
43 Vote in European Parliament on amendment to Community budget. 
the United Kingdom by extra payments, partly by direct payments to the British 
Treasury under the  financial  mechanism,  specially revised  for  the  purpose, and 
partly in the form of generous priority payments from the Regional Fund. 
In summer 1981 the Commission published an extensive document containing the 
proposals deriving from the mandate of 30 May 1980. As the Commission was later 
to discover, the European Council of Heads of State or Government which took 
place at Lancaster House, London, at the end of November 1981 had set itself an 
impossible task since it was 'determined to square the circle by restructuring the bud-
get and correcting imbalances in the burdens borne by the Member States without 
making more own resources available' (Commission, Working for Europe, 1981-
85). 
The milestones of  Stuttgart and Fontainebleau 
This 'impossible task' proved to be a burden on the following summits and on innu-
merable meetings of the Council in its various compositions. There was no rap-
44 prochement of any type until the Stuttgart European Council of 17 to 19 June 1983 
when the Heads of State or Government agreed on a work programme containing 
all the burning issues in connection with agricultural reform, budgetary discipline, 
budgetary balance, Portuguese and Spanish accession and new policies in various 
sectors. 
The joint declaration presenting what has become known as the 'Stuttgart package' 
stated for the first time: 
'On the basis of the conclusions reached on development of policies, improv-
ing budgetary discipline  and the examination of the financial  system,  the 
extent and timing of the Community's requirements in terms of own resou-
rces will be determined.' 
In addition to this declaration, the package also contained the agreement that a joint 
decision would eventually be taken on all these questions and the following objec-
tive: 
'The accession negotiations with Spain and Portugal will be pursued with the 
objective of  concluding them, so that the accession Treaties can be submitted 
for  ratification when the result  of the  negotiation  concerning  the future 
financing of the Community is submitted.' 
The comprehensive negotiations resulting from the Stuttgart compromise proved to 
be so tricky that the following two summits (December 1983 in Athens and March 
1984 in Brussels), despite coming close to agreement, failed to settle anything. 
However, the progress made allowed the agriculture ministers to achieve a break-
through which satisfied the main demands of the Stuttgart package after long nego-
tiations at their Council meeting on 31 March 1984, in particular as regards measur-
es to contain costs by reducing the production of surpluses (guarantee thresholds) 
and the dismantling of monetary compensatory amounts (see above). The following 
summit at Fontainebleau on 25 and 26 June 1984 took this as a basis for a far-reach-
ing agreement on budgetary imbalances, own resources and enlargement, and the 
financing of the 1984 budget. It also gave formal confirmation of the agreements 
already reached at the previous Brussels summit on budgetary and financial discip-
line. The most important parts of the Fontainebleau agreement, which should serve 
as a guideline for future years, are as follows: 
1.  Budgetary imbalances 
1.  Expenditure policy  is  ultimately the essential  means of resolving  the 
question of budgetary imbalances. 
However, it has been decided that any Member State sustaining a budgetary 
burden which is  excessive in  relation to its relative prosperity may benefit 
from a correction at the appropriate time. 
45 46 
The basis for the correction is the gap between the share of VAT payments 
and  the  share  of expenditure  allocated  in  accordance  with  the  present 
criteria. 
2.  As far as the United Kingdom is concerned, the following arrangement is 
adopted: 
(i)  for 1984, a lump sum of 1 000 million ECU is fixed; 
(ii)  from 1985 the gap (base of the correction) as defined in paragraph 1 is, 
for the period referred to in paragraph 4, corrected annually at 66%. 
3.  The corrections foreseen in paragraph 2 will be deducted from the Uni-
ted Kingdom's normal VAT share in the budget year following the one in 
respect of which the correction is  granted. The resulting cost for the other 
Member States will be shared among them according to their normal VAT 
share, adjusted to allow the Federal Republic of Germany's share to move to 
two-thirds of its VAT share. 
4.  The correction formula foreseen in paragraph 2 (second indent) will be a 
part of the decision to increase the VAT ceiling to 1.4%, their durations 
being linked. 
One year before the new ceiling is reached, the Commission will present to 
the Council a report setting out the state of play on: 
(i) the result of the budgetary discipline; 
(ii) the Community's financial needs; 
(iii) the  breakdown of the budgetary costs  among Member States, having 
regard to their relative prosperity, and the consequences to be drawn from 
this for the application of the budgetary corrections. 
The Council  will  re-examine  the  question  as  a  whole  and will  take  the 
appropriate decisions ex novo. 
2.  Own resources and enlargement 
The maximum rate of mobilization of VAT will be 1.4% on 1 January 1986; 
this maximum rate applies to every Member State and will enter into force as 
soon as the ratification procedures are completed, and by 1 January 1986 at 
the latest. 
The maximum rate may be increased to 1.6% on 1 January 1988 by unanim-
ous decision of  the Council and after agreement has been given in accordance 
with national procedures. (Bulletin EC 6-1984) 3.  Financing of the 1984 budget 
The European Council agreed that, pending national parliaments' ratifica-
tion of the increase in own resources, steps will be taken at the next (Budget) 
Council meeting to cover the needs of the 1984 budget to ensure that the 
Community operates normally. 
It was hoped that this would end the battle about budgetary policy. Howe-
ver, the interpretation of certain parts of this text has since led to new prob-
lems. In establishing rules on budgetary discipline, the Ministers were unable 
to go much beyond platitudes. 
Special arrangements for Greece 
For Greece, which became a member on 1 January 1981, a special protecting system 
was adopted. The basic rule was, of course, that revenue from customs duties, agri-
cultural levies, and value-added tax accrue to the Community immediately. Since it 
would take time before this new Member State could derive the full  benefit from 
membership, particularly where the agricultural fund is  concerned, Greece had a 
transitional arrangement for five  years whereby part of the revenue theoretically 
accruing to the Community would be refunded to it. (70% of the Community por-
tion of value-added tax in 1981, gradually diminishing to 10% in 1985). 
Similar special arrangements are envisaged in the accession negotiations with Portu-
gal and Spain. According to the Commission's estimates, their entry into the Com-
munity will lead to a 10-12% increase in the volume of the budget. 
47 F. The budget procedure 
Under pressure from the European Parliament, the budgetary procedure has been 
constantly revised in recent years. But in the present 'pre-federalist' stage the proce-
dure still falls far short of normal and accepted practice in a parliamentary democra-
cy. However, the consultation procedure between Parliament and the Council, as 
followed at present, is gradually evolving into a federal 'two-chamber system'. Par-
liament and the Council together make up the 'budgetary authority'. 
A gap in the democratic process at the new budget level 
It was pointed out earlier that funds of the order of 1% of the Community's gross 
domestic product are now administered, committed and spent by the Community 
rather than by national budgetary authorities: this also implies that management of 
49 these funds has been and will continue to be withdrawn from national parliaments, 
with their powers of initiation and control, and transferred to a new level where no 
equivalent parliamentary control exists. Decisions relating to three-quarters of the 
budgetary expenditure ('compulsory expenditure') are taken by the Council, acting 
in the capacity of 'legislator'. Only in respect of the remaining quarter ('non-com-
pulsory  expenditure')  does  the  European  Parliament  have  the  power to  make 
changes, and even then only to a fairly limited extent. 
The complex consultat!on procedure 
The struggle for budgetary powers has not made it any easier for outsiders to under-
stand the procedure for the passage of the budget laid down in the Treaties (in parti-
cular Article 203 of the EEC Treaty) and in the supplementary agreements. We shall 
therefore  give  a  greatly  simplified  description  of the  various  stages  (in  practice 
dates between six and eight weeks earlier than those given at stages 1, 2 and 3 below 
apply). 
1. Before 1 July, each institution draws up an estimate of its expenditure in the next 
financial year (1  January to 31  December). The Commission consolidates these 
estimates in a 'preliminary draft budget'. 
2. By 1 September at the latest, the Commission places the preliminary draft budget, 
containing the collective estimates of  revenue and expenditure, before the Counil. 
3. The Council consults the other institutions concerned whenever it intends to 
modify the preliminary draft budget. It then establishes the draft budget, acting 
by a qualified majority, and forwards it to Parliament not later than 5 October. 
(First reading by the Council.) 
4. Parliament has the right to amend the draft budget as regards non-compulsory 
expenditure, acting by a majority of its members, and to propose to the Council, 
acting  by  an absolute majority of the votes cast, modifications to compulsory 
expenditure. 
5. If, within 45 days of the draft budget being placed before it (first reading by Par-
liament), Parliament has given its approval, the budget stands finally adopted. If, 
on  the  other  hand,  Parliament  proposes  modifications,  the  draft  budget  -
together with the proposed modifications - is returned to the Council, since the 
Council has the last word on compulsory expenditure. 
6. If, within 15 days (second reading by the Council), the Council accepts Parlia-
ment's amendments  and proposed modifications, the budget  is  deemed  to be 
finally  adopted. If the Council modifies Parliament's amendments or proposed 
modifications, the draft budget is again forwarded to Parliament together with a 
report of the results of the Council's deliberations. 
so 7. Within 15 days (second reading by Parliament) Parliament acts- by a majority 
of its members and three-fifths of the votes cast - on the modifications to its 
amendments made by the Council, and adopts the budget. At this stage the 'con-
ciliation procedure' between Council and Parliament, introduced in the Treaty of 
22July 1975 (which entered into force on 1 June 1977), comes into play. 
After long negotiations, this was supplemented on 30 June 1982 by a joint dec-
laration of the representatives of Parliament, the Council and the Commission to 
ensure a smoother budgetary procedure. 
8. When this procedure has been completed, the President of Parliament declares 
that the budget has been finally adopted. He therefore has 'the last word' at this 
stage (as the President of the Council of Ministers had earlier). This power has 
been  increased  since  1977, in  accordance  with  the  Treaty of 22 July  1975: 
Parliament may now reject the entire draft budget and ask for a new draft to be 
submitted. 
Conflicts since 1980 
Parliament has made use of the two extreme forms of its power. In the year of its 
first direct election (1979) it rejected the draft budget for 1980 at the final reading. 
For the first half of 1980 the Community consequently had to work each month 
with one-twelfth of the total resources entered in the budget for the previous year, as 
the whole budgetary procedure had to be started from scratch and was only comple-
ted on 9 July 1980, following the compromise of  30 May. This emergency source of 
finance (monthly expenditure is restricted to one-twelfth of the funds provided in the 
previous budget) is provided for in Article 204 of the EEC Treaty. Then at the end 
of 1980, there was another confrontation between the Council and Parliament. Par-
liament's then President, Mrs Simone Veil, declared that a supplementary budget for 
1980 and the budget for 1981 had been adopted, in the exercise of her right to have 
the 'last word', whereas a number of governments considered that the budgetary 
procedure had not yet been properly completed. As  a result a number of Member 
States refused to pay part of their contributions and were taken to the Court of 
Justice. 
The tables give only a very incomplete picture of Parliament's margin of manreuvre, 
which is  subject to a series of restrictions. As a result a whole terminology is con-
stantly being used throughout the budgetary procedure. To the layman the various 
concepts used will be all the more obscure as they do not have the same importance 
- if indeed they exist at all - in the context of national budgets. 
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Sector 
I. Agricultural market  guarantees 
EAGGF Guarantee 
2. Structural policies 
EAGGF Guidance 
Specific agricultural measures 
Fisheries 
Regional Fund 
EMS 
Supplementary measures (UK) 
Miscellaneous-Regional 
Transport 
Social Fund 
Miscellaneous-Social 
Education and culture 
Environment and consumers 
3. Research, Energy and Industry 
Energy policy 
Research and investment 
Information and innovation 
Industry and internal market 
. 
Total1 
Total2 
Total3 
Community expenditure 
Appropriations for commitments 
Budget 1984 1  Preliminary draft 1985 2 
Amount  I 
'Yo  Amount  I 
% 
1  l 
2  3  l 
4 
18 333 000 000  62.65  19 955 000 000  63.35 
18 333 000 000  62.65  19 955 000 000  63.35 
723 500 000  2.47  834 341000  2.65 
86 560 000  0.30  94 859 000  0.30 
159 108 000  0.54  181070 000  0.57 
2 140 000 000  7.31  2 250 000 000  7.14 
pm  - pm  -
pm  - pm  -
45 700 000  0.16  227 750 000  0.72 
81750 000  0.28  111750 000  0.35 
1 846000 000  6.31  1940 000 000  6.16 
175 022 000  0.60  188 997 000  0.60 
18 956 000  O.D7  20 360 000  0.06 
19 964 000  0.07  21019 000  0.07 
5 296 560 000  18.10  5 870 146 000  18.64 
168774 000 
3  0.58  156 465 000  0.50 
750 598 000  2.57  914 767 000  2.90 
29 435 000  0.10  23 200 000  0.07 
69 521000  0.24  52 370 000  0.17 
1018 328 000  3.48  1146 802 000  3.64 
-------·--
Council draft 24. 4. 1985'  Olange 
Amount  I 
%  'Yo 
5  I 
6  7=5/1 
19 955 000 000  66.58  +  8.85 
19 955 000 000  66.58  +  8.85 
640 967 700  2.14  - 11.41 
55 427 300  0.18  - 35.97 
154 351400  0.51  - 2.99 
2 240000 000  7.47  +  4.67 
pm  - -
pm  - -
87 200 000  0.29  +  90.81 
31350 000  0.10  - 61.65 
1940 000 000  6.47  +  5.09 
177 869 000  0.59  +  1.63 
18 747 500  0.06  - 1.10 
14770 000  0.05  - 26.02 
5 360 682 900  17.88  +  1.21 
137 700 000  0.46  - 18.41 
788 048 400  2.63  +  4.99 
9 685 000  0.03  - 67.10 
33 350 000  0.11  - 52.03 
968 783 400  3.23  - 4.87 c., 
w 
4. Repayments and resen•es 
Repayments to the Member States 
Other repayments 
Financial mechanism 
Miscellaneous-guarantees 
Reserves 
Total4 
5. Development cooperation and non-member 
countries 
EDF 
Food aid 
Non-ass. dev. countries 
Specific and exceptional measures 
Cooperation with Mediterranean countries 
Miscellaneous 
TotalS 
6. Staff  and administration 
Section III A 
Sections I, II, IV and V 
Total6 
Grand total 
1 Including SU!'Piement:uy and amending budget No 1/84. 
2 Including first, second and third letters of amendment. 
3 Including 30 million ECU in Olapter I 00. 
1105 343 000 
44 831392 
-
pm 
1 207 000 000 • 
2 357 174 392 
pm 
506100 000 
237 050 000 
113 170 000 
108 000 000 
58 500 000 
1022 820 000 
811010 055 
425 562 275 
1 236 572 330 
29 264 454 722 
• I nduding I Z02 million ECU in Olapter I 00 for UKIFR of  Germany measur<S. 
• Including first and second letters of amendment. 
6 lncluding 70 million ECU in Olapter 100 for integrated Mediterranean programm<S. 
3.78 
0.15 
-
-
4.13 
8.06 
-
1.73 
0.81 
0.39 
0.37 
0.20 
3.50 
2.77 
1.45 
4.23 
100 
1070 265 000  3.40  1047 098 000  3.49  - 5.27 
23 994 776  0.08  23 620 098  0.08  - 47.31 
- - - - -
520 000 000  1.65  pm  - -
5 000 000  0.02  75 000 000 6  0.25  - 93.79 
1619 259 776  5.14  1145 718 098  3.82  - 51.39 
pm  - - - -
731000 000  2.32  618 694 800  2.06  +  22.25 
325 232 000  1.03  252 850 000  0.84  +  6.67 
69 980 000  0.22  53 500 000  0.18  - 52.73 
355 100 000  1.13  236 900 000  0.79  + 119.35 
65 300 000  0.21  61 240 000  0.20  +  4.68 
1 546 612 000  4.91  1 223 184 800  4.08  +  19.59 
921 757 450  2.93  875 857 600  2.92  +  8.00 
438 709 060  1.40  445 251563  1.49  +  4.63 
1360 466 510  4.32  1 321109 163  4.41  +  6.84 
31 498 286 286  100  29 974 478 361  100  +  2.43 ""  .:. 
Sector 
1. Agricultural market guarantees 
EAGGF Guarantee 
2. Structural policies 
EAGGF Guidance 
Specific agricultural measures 
Fisheries 
Regional Fund 
EMS 
Supplementary measures (UK) 
Miscellaneous-Regional 
Transport 
Social Fund 
Miscellaneous-Social 
Education and culture 
Environment and consumers 
3. Research, Energy and Industry 
Energy policy 
Research and investment 
Information and innovation 
Industry and internal market 
Total! 
Total2 
Total3 
Community Expenditure 
Appropriations for payments 
Budget 1984 1  Preliminary draft 1985 2 
Amount  I 
%  Amount  I 
% 
I  I 
2  3  I 
4 
18 333 000 000  67.28  19 955 000 000  68.04 
18 333 000 000  67.28  19 955 000 000  68.04 
595 610 000  2.19  856 800 000  2.92 
79 520 000  0.29  83 039 000  0.28 
112 358 000  0.41  139 670 000  0.48 
1412 500 000  5.18  1 642 500 000  5.60 
pm  - pm  -
pm  - - -
42 300 000  0.16  62 750 000  0.21 
33 750 000  0.12  35 750 000  0.13 
1 220 000 000  4.48  1376 000 000  4.69 
174 222 000  0.64  187 896 000  0.64 
18 956 000  0.07  20 360 000  0.07 
16 214 000  0.06  17169 000  0.06 
3 705 430 000  13.60  4 421934 000  15.08 
114 789 000 3  0.42  91965 000  0.31 
514 567 000  1.89  614 050 000  2.09 
26 046 000  0.10  15 550 000  0.05 
63 901000  0.24  56 030 000  0.20 
719 303 000  2.64  777 595 000  2.65 
·-- - ---·- -
Council draft 24. 4. 1985 
5  Change 
Amount  I 
%  % 
5  I 
6  7 = 5/1 
19 955 000 000  71.45  +  8.85 
19 955 000 000  71.45  +  8.85 
632 464 700  2.26  +  6.19 
53 977 300  0.19  - 32.12 
109 601 400  0.39  - 2.45 
1 610 000 000  5.76  +  13.98 
pm  - -
pm  - -
52 200 000  0.19  +  23.40 
21350 000  0.08  - 36.74 
1 358 000 000  4.86  +  11.31 
177 727 000  0.64  +  2.01 
18 747 500  0.07  - 1.10 
11420 000  0.04  - 29.57 
4 045 487 900  14.48  +  9.18 
83 700 000  0.30  - 27.08 
532 247 400  1.91  +  3.44 
8 385 000  0.03  - 67.81 
37150 000  0.13  - 41.86 
661482 400  2.37  - 8.04 
-- ---v.  v. 
4.  Repayments and reserves 
Repayments to the Member States 
Other repayments 
Financial mechanism 
Miscellaneous-guarantees 
Reserves 
Tota14 
5. Development cooperation and non-member 
countries 
EDF 
Food aid 
Non-ass. dev. countries 
Specific and exceptional measures 
Cooperation with Mediterranean countries 
Miscellaneous 
TotalS 
6. Staff  and administration 
Section III A 
Sections I, II, IV and V 
Total6 
Grand total 
1 Jncludingsupplementaryand amending budget No 1/84. 
2 Including first, second and third letters of amendment. 
3 Including 30 million ECU in Chapter 100. 
1105 343 000 
44831392 
-
pm 
1 207 000 000 
4 
2 357 174 392 
pm 
506 100 000 
131 305 000 
95 170 000 
106 073 000 
58 500 000 
897 148 000 
811 010 055 
425 562 275 
1 236 572 330 
27 248 627 722 
4 Including 1 202 million ECU in Olapter 100 for UK/FR of  Germany measures. 
5 Including frrst and second letters of  amendment. 
6 Including 70 million ECU in Chapter 100 for Integrated Mediterranean programmes. 
4.06 
0.17 
-
-
4.43 
8.65 
-
1.86 
0.48 
0.35 
0.39 
0.22 
3.29 
2.98 
1.56 
4.54 
100 
1070 265 000  3.65  1047 098 000  3.75  - 5.27 
23 994 776  0.08  23 620 098  0.08  - 47.31 
- - - - -
520 000 000  1.77  pm  - -
5 000 000  0.02  5 000 000 6  0.02  - 100.00 
1 619 259 776  5.52  1 075 718 098  3.85  - 54.36 
pm  - - - -
532 900 000  1.82  391 561 900  1.40  - 22.63 
173 770 000  0.60  128 750 000  0.46  - 1.96 
70 980 000  0.24  41  500 000  0.15  - 56.39 
349 250 000  1.20  248 627 700  0.89  + 134.39 
65 300 000  0.22  61  240 000  0.22  +  4.68 
1192 200 000  4.07  871 679 600  3.12  - 2.84 
921  757 450  3.14  875 857 600  3.14  +  8.00 
438 709 060  1.50  445 251563  1.59  +  4.63 
1 360 466 510  4.64  1 321109 163  4.73  +  6.84 
29 326 455 286  100  27 930 477 161  100  +  2.50 Comparison between the general budget of the European Communities, the 
budgets of the Member States and the Community's gross domestic product 
General budget of the 
General budget  European Communities 1  Central 
government  as%of 
budgets  Community  EAGGF,  oft  he 
Unit  of  which  Guarantee  Member 
GOP  national  Community 
Total  EAGGF  as%  States 
budgets  GOP 
Guarantee  of total  2:5  2:6 
I  2  3  4  5  6  1  8 
1973  Miou.a.  4 641  3 594  77.4  227 700  870 200  2.0  0.53 
1974  Miou.a.  5 037  3 390  67.3  268 300  987 900  1.9  0.51 
1975  Miou.a.  6 214  4 327  69.6  337 500  1 132 600  1.8  0.55 
1976  Miou.a.  7 993  5 710  71.4  387 900  1 315 100  2.1  0.61 
1977  Miou.a.  8 483  6 512  76.8  442 600  1483 800  1.9  0.57 
1977  MioEUA 2  8 500  405 400  1415 600  2.1  0.60 
1978  MioEUA 2  12 384  8 679  70.8  470 200  1 569 100  2.6  0.79 
1979  MioEUA 2  14076  10 387  73.8  527 300  1 763 400  2.7  0.83 
1980  MioEUA 2  15 975  11 2923  70.7  621900  1 987 500  2.7  0.80 
1981  MioECU 2  17 885  10 9523  61.2  731 700  2 205 400  2.4  0.81 
1982  MioECU 2  20 697  12 294  59.4  844 710  2 404 000  2.5  0.86 
1983  MioECU 2  22 896  14 0503  61.4  911460  2 566 soo•  2.5  0.89 
1984  MioECU 2  25 361  16 500
3  65.1  966 800
4  2 781 000
6  2.6  0.91 
1985  MioECU 2  28 103  19 3153  68.7  '  2 990 000
6  0.94 
1 Appropriations for payments: 
-1973-1983 a  expenditure against appropriations for the financial year as shown In the revenue and expenditure accounts, including 
carryovers. 
-1984:  Budget adopted on 20 December 1983. 
- 1985:  Preliminary draft Budget. 
2 Conversion rates: 
1977 to 1983 •  average rates for the year. 
-1984:  the Community budget usesthe rate obtaining on 5 Apri11983. 
- 1985:  the general budget and supplementary budgets use the rate obtaining on I February 1984. 
3 Including refunds for food aid and ACP sugar. 
4 Estimate. 
5 An estimate cannot be made at present. 
6 Budget estimate. 
Terminology and significance 
Parliament  can  exert  influence  only  in  respect  of non-compulsory  expenditure 
(NCE), and then only within a fixed 'maximum rate'. Confusion also often arises 
when the amounts being debated relate to 'commitment appropriations', although 
only the total amount of 'payment appropriation' is equal to the total amount of 
revenue, with which it must be balanced. What does it all mean? 
56 Maximum rate of increase in expenditure 
The maximum rate for each financial year is determined before 1 May of  the preced-
ing year as the arithmetic mean of: 
(a) the trend of  the gross national product (in volume terms) within the Community; 
(b) the average variation in the budgets of the Member States; and 
(c) the trend of the cost of living during the preceding financial year. 
The maximum rates fixed in recent years have been done as follows: 
Community budget for 1975: 14.6% 
Community budget for 1976: 15.3% 
Community budget for 1977: 17.3% 
Community budget for 1978: 13.6% 
Community budget for 1979: 11.4% 
Community budget for 1980: 13.3% 
Community budget for 1981: 12.2% 
Community budget for 1982: 14.5% 
Community budget for 1983: 11.8% 
Community budget for 1984: 11.6% 
Community budget for 1985:  8.0% 
These maximum rates of increase determined by objective criteria from the second 
year  before  the  budgetary year apply only to non-compulsory expenditure,  i.e. 
about one-quarter of the volume of the budget. It should also be borne in mind that 
these criteria cover varying trends in the different Member States: 
Belgium 
Denmark 
FR of Germany 
Greece 
France 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
United Kingdom 
Community 
Growth 1980-1984 
(Index 1984: 1980 = 100) 
Gross domestic product 1  Dudgetary expenditure 2 
126.0  143 
138.5  170 
114.6  119 
210.6  304 
148.8  150 
160.6  166 
176.6  148 
136.1  138 
116.9  149 
130.9  135 
136.7  169
3 
1 Souru: Eurostat: Data for short·term economic analyses 111985. 
2 Sourct: Federal Ministry of Finance, Donn, !9BS Financial Report, page 248. 
3 Community budget. 
Consumer prices 1 
134.0 
139.8 
118.4 
214.6 
149.2 
169.2 
174.3 
135.7 
119.5 
133.4 
140.7 
57 Compulsory and non-compulsory expenditure 
Parliament can influence only what is known as 'non-compulsory expenditure'. This 
is  expenditure 'other than that necessarily resulting from the Treaty or from acts 
adopted in accordance therewith'. The demarcation is a constant source of diffic-
ulty, as the Council tries to keep the proportion of non-compulsory expenditure as 
low as possible, whereas Parliament is keen to have the greatest possible room for 
manreuvre. The general budget published in the Official Journal does not make the 
distinction between non-compulsory and compulsory too dear. The actual ratio is 
about  one-quarter  non-compulsory  to  three-quarters  compulsory,  with  non-
compulsory tending to rise. 
Commitment and payment appropriations 
A distinction is made in the tables between 'appropriations for commitments' and 
'appropriations for payments'. This distinction has been made in order to obtain a 
clearer picture of what, in  accordance with accounting principles, must be made 
available for  immediate payment and what must be  kept available for liabilities 
extending beyond the financial year. 
Commitment appropriations cover legal liabilities for the financial year, including 
those extending beyond the financial year. 
Payment  appropriations cover expenditure incurred during the financial  year in 
meeting legal liabilities (including those from previous financial years). The payment 
appropriations thus cover all funds for the budget year in question. 
Both have their own intrinsic value: 
(i)  appropriations for commitments provide an earlier picture than appropriations 
for payments of the general trend in activities and policies which are only just 
getting under way. They also show the payments which the Community is going 
to have to make sooner or later; 
(ii)  appropriations for payments-and they alone- must be covered by revenue in 
the budget year in question. 
A six-page table in Part B (operating expenditure) of the general budget published in 
the Official journal of the European Communities lists the budget headings which 
distinguish between commitment and payment appropriations. 
58 G. Budget reality and prospects 
The budgets of  the institutions 
The  following  appropriations were  entered in  the  1984 budget for  the  various 
institutions: 
million ECU  Institution 
219.9  European Parliament 
112.1  Council 
24.9  Economic and Social Committee 
31.3  Court of Justice 
18.1  Court of Auditors 
811.0  Commission 
This expenditure on personnel and administration comes to 4.54% of the volume of 
the budget in payment appropriations. This is  much the same as the agreed 10% 
refund paid to the Member States in 1984 for the cost of collecting customs duties 
and agricultural levies. At 1 100 million ECU, these refunds accounted for 4.06% 
of the 1984 budget. 
The language factor 
The language factor must be taken into account in any comparison of Community 
budget expenditure on personnel and administration and that of national budgets. 
The apparently high staffing levels of the Community's institutions are often critici-
zed. People overlook the fact that these institutions have to work in seven or more 
languages. 
All important meetings must have facilities for interpreting out of  each of seven lan-
guages into the six others. All important documents have to be translated into the 
seven  official  languages  (German, French,  English,  Italian,  Dutch,  Danish  and 
59 Greek) and, as enlargement approaches, into Portuguese and Spanish. Eurocrats are 
expected to work in a number of  languages but there is still a great need for interpre-
ters and translators. Each additional language requires an extra 200 to 250. At con-
ferences and meetings, simultaneous interpreting out of and into seven languages 
gives 42 potential combinations. This figure increases geometrically and not arith-
metically. Interpreting out of and into nine languages gives 72 potential combina-
tions. The relay method is often used in these cases. Interpreters for one or more lan-
guages interpret at second hand, i.e. they interpret from a language into which the 
original language has already been interpreted. Even then at least 20 interpreters are 
needed for seven languages and at least 30 for nine languages. 
In the 1984 budget language service posts therefore account for almost 16% of the 
total staff complement: 
Commission 
Parliament 
Council 
Court of  Justice 
Economic and Social Committee 
Court of Auditors 
1327 out of  9 664 = 13.73% 
485  out of  2 635 = 18.41% 
352  out of  1 790 = 19.66% 
119  out of  469 = 25.37% 
82  out of  400 = 20.5  % 
36 out of  273 = 13.19% 
Total  2 401  out of 15 231 = 15.76% 
Any attempt to reduce the costs of the language service by having only a small num-
ber of working languages is doomed to fail. Everybody in the Community must be 
able to feel that he is part of the community. This is important, if only because the 
courts in the Member States are now dealing with cases arising from Community 
law. The principle of legal certainty and equality before the law which derives from 
civil rights alone makes it necessary for all the legal acts of  the Community affecting 
the citizen and/  or the economic affairs of the Community to be adopted and publis-
hed with equal validity in all the official languages. 
In practice, though, French and English have become the most usual working lan-
guages for internal administrative purposes. 
Court of  Auditors finally set up 
The Treaty between the Governments of the Member States amending certain finan-
cial provisions which was concluded on 22 July 1975 and entered into force on 1 
June 1977 not only extended Parliament's budgetary powers but also set up the 
60 Community's Court of Auditors. Parliament had long been striving for this.  The 
constituent session of the Court of Auditors was held in Luxembourg on 25 October 
1977. It follows the example of  existing courts of  auditors in most Member States in 
that it is an independent body headed by a ten-member panel. It replaces the former 
Audit Board, which could only perform its duties on a part-time basis, thus drawing 
frequent criticism from Parliament. The Court of Auditors scrutinizes all Commun-
ity revenue and expenditure, and decides whether financial management has been 
sound. It can also carry out checks in the Member States in conjunction with the 
individual national audit authorities and demand the documentation required for 
this purpose. It submits an annual report. The individual authorities can reply to the 
comments and objections made; these replies are published in the Official Journal 
together with the annual report. The open nature of  financial control and the trans-
parency of financial affairs by which the Parliament and some governments set great 
store has thus been achieved or improved. It is also furthered by the more rigorous 
control whereby the Court of  Auditors can at any time before completion of a finan-
cial year, deliver an opinion on particular matters, and where specifically requested, 
subject uncompleted accounting processes to a check or special analysis. 
The large number of special  reports drawn up  and sometimes published by the 
Court of Auditors should be mentioned in this connection. Particular importance is 
attached to the report on the financial management of Community activities drawn 
up in October 1983 on the instructions of the Stuttgart European Council. 
As yet neither an instrument of  redistribution nor of  stabilization 
At the present stage of integration, the Commission's overall assessment of budget-
ary problems in the Community made in its communication to the Joint Council of 
61 Foreign and Financial Affairs Ministers and to the European Parliament in March 
1978 applies: 
'The Community budget, not insignificant in absolute terms yet relatively 
very small and very heavily weighted in favour of  one policy, reflects the real-
ity of a very partial and extremely localized financial integration. At present, 
it is neither a true instrument for financing a wide range of policies nor a 
means of redistribution worthy of the name, nor an instrument of economic 
stabilization. 
At the risk of appearing out of step with public opinion, it must be said that, 
objectively, the budget today in no way measures up to the part it is expected 
to play in the move towards greater economic integration. The deepening of 
the Community requires a major expansion of the financial resources availa-
ble to it.' (COM(78) 64 final of 1 March 1978, p. 2). 
Naturally, the Commission adds, the aim is not a budget comparable in size to that 
of a central budget in a federal State. In view of the impending accession of  Portugal 
and Spain this topic is moving to the forefront of public discussion. 
2.. 
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3 Adjustment of  budget policy 
In  his inaugural speech to the European Parliament on 14 January 1985 the new 
Commission President Mr Jacques Delors recalled a statement by a previous Presi-
dent, Roy Jenkins, to Parliament in 1977 and echoed its sentiments: 
'The Community ...  can create and give more than it receives, but only if 
the Member States, peoples and governments alike, have the vision to ask 
what they can contribute, and not just what they can get.' 
Mr Delors added that the new Commission would keep these considerations at the 
front of its mind when the problem of adapting the Community's budgetary and 
financial resources to its desired objectives hat to be posed in realistic and balanced 
terms. 
'This deadline is  closer than some people think because,  as  the outgoing 
Commission constantly stressed, a balanced and efficient Community cannot 
be built on a VAT rate limited to 1.6%. I construe this as meaning that we 
must strike a balance between our ambitions and our resources, applying the 
principles of sound management to all types of  expenditure. But we must also 
answer the following questions: in certain cases would not an extra 10 ECU 
in the Community budget have a greater multiplier effect than an extra ECU 
in the budgets of each of the 10 Member States?' 
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The European Community's budget now represents a 
tidy sum-close on 20 000 million ECU in  1981. But 
this is less than 1% of the gross domestic product of the 
10 Member States, whereas national budgets account 
for  between  32 and 56%  of GDP  depending on the 
country. 
There is  a strong temptation, particularly when times 
are hard, to make the Community budget the scapegoat 
for a number of ills afflicting public finances. 
This  booklet  explains  the  revenue  and  expenditure 
systems of the European Community. 
The bulk of the Community's revenue is  made of cus-
toms duties and agricultural levies charged on imports 
of products from non-member countries, and a propor-
tion of Member States' VAT receipts - up to the equi-
valent of a 1% rate. 
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of Auditors  keeps  a  very  close  watch  on  the  imple-
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